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Περιεχόμενα (κλικ για μετάβαση)
1. Philippos Stylianou, Hannay’s misleading diplomacy, Cyprus Weekly
2. Μάρτιν Πάκαρντ, Χάνεϊ, ο λάθος άνθρωπος στην αναζήτηση λύσεων
Another fine mess,
courtesy of Kofi Annan's U.N.
by Christopher Hitchens.
4. An International Relations Debacle: The UN Secretar-General’s Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus 1999-2004. By Claire Palley Συνέντευξη
5. Marios L. Evriviades on Claire Palley' s book
6. Book Review, Palley's An international Relations debacle, Nicholas G. Karambelas Published in
7. Μάριος Ευριβιάδης: Ηλιάδης και Packard: Δύο βιβλία για την Κύπρο και την κρίσιμη περίοδο 1959- 1964
8. David Hannay: Cyprus: The Search for a Solution. London: I. B. Tauris,2005 by Martin Packard.
David Hannay:Cyprus: The Search for a Solution. London: I. B. Tauris,
2005. 256 pages. ISBN 1-850436-65-7. $46.00. Reviewed by Martin
Lord David Hannay has written a very readable book. Sadly, though, it offers nothing
of real value to the Cyprus debate. Starting from a fl awed concept of Cypriot history, it
proceeds entertainingly to a set of fl awed conclusions. That the middle, diary sections
have a patina of whole-hearted objectivity does not detract from the subjectivity of the
work as a whole. It will damage the Cypriot cause, and maybe help that of London,
by diverting international attention from the reality of the problems that have been
imposed on Cyprus. It also will strengthen a Cypriot view that Whitehall should cease
to represent itself as a competent interpreter of Cypriot affairs.
Lord Hannay was the wrong man to be involved in a search for solutions in Cyprus:
too clever, too arrogant in his own views, too much a product of the Whitehall establishment.
He came with a reputation as a successful operator at the United Nations, as a
broker of compromises rather than as an advocate of justice. In Cyprus, as was to be
expected, he worked for a compromise between external interests and Cypriot rights.
What Cyprus needed was a facilitator with a genuine commitment to an ethical solution—
it needed a man who was answerable to the Cypriot people rather than to any
outside power; it needed someone with emotional sympathy rather than intellectualism;
it needed a lateral thinker rather than a practitioner of realpolitik.
Lord Hannay is an advocate of a “virgin birth” for Cyprus. He considers that Cypriot
history should start from about 1990, and that thirty years of Turkish occupation and
more than double that of British complicity in dividing Cyprus should be accepted as
done deeds, rather than as separate issues that need to be addressed before any real
process of intercommunal solution can begin.
Inherent in this book is the double standard between international pressure for Syr-
Martin Packard MBE is retired lieutenant commander of the Royal Navy and former intelligence
advisor to the commander-in-chief, Mediterranean Comedsoueast.
ian withdrawal from Lebanon and international toleration of the continued Turkish
military and intelligence presence in Cyprus. The UN and the United States have been
strong in their advocacy of decolonization: is it diffi cult for them to understand that
Britain and Turkey have effectively imposed a form of neocolonialism on Cyprus?
The constitution that was pushed onto Cyprus in 1960 was the most circumscribed
and least democratic outcome of any independence process in modern history. It was
based on ethnic division; it conferred on foreign powers the right to meddle in Cypriot
affairs in pursuit of their own interests; it wholly failed to lay the foundations for an
organic welding of the Cypriot people into a dynamic and viable partnership. In exactly
similar fashion the architects of the Annan Plan have produced proposals that would
require the Cypriots to accept arrangements that are in profound derogation of the
norms both of the UN and of the European Union and that do nothing to encourage the
island’s inhabitants toward a genuine partnership.
The reason for these derogations had little to do with intercommunal problems.
The massive demonstration of intercommunal compatibility at the popular level since
the 2003 opening of the Green Line has laid to rest the myth, long cultivated by selfinterested
outsiders, that reengagement would be characterized by acrimony and
violence. The nub of the diffi culty in producing a proposal for Cyprus acceptable to
London and Washington lies rather with the strategic interests that Britain and Turkey
consider themselves to have in the island and with attempts by Washington and London
to keep the Turkish army onsite.
Lord Hannay’s failure to address the realities of the Turkish military’s current occupation
of a large section of Cyprus gives an Alice-in-Wonderland dimension to the
whole of his book. He, like other British commentators, suggests that the Greek Cypriots
should trust the goodwill of the Turkish army. Given that army’s long-standing claim
that it needs to be able to exercise an effective control over the whole of Cyprus, this
suggestion would seem to be either duplicitous or disingenuous, or both.
In a quite appalling article in 2004, headlined “Greek Cypriots Must Pay the Price
of Folly,” Hannay laid blame on the Greek Cypriots and their president. There was not
one word of humility or suggestion that those who concocted the fi nal terms of the fi fth
version of the Annan Plan might have failed in their task to deliver an equitable proposal
or that the Greek-Cypriot vote in fact suggested an electorate with considerable
intelligence. If the views in that article tally with those of the British government, as I
suspect, it is easy to understand why relations between Nicosia and London are now at
an all-time low.
It is a major problem for Cyprus that Britain has acquired acceptance by much of
the EU, the UN, and the United States as a valid spokesman on Cypriot affairs. People
of substance listen when Hannay or Whitehall lay out their views, whereas Cypriot
attempts at explanation or rebuttal are disregarded. Key politicians and media commentators
normally noted for their objectivity refuse to listen to criticism of Annan 5,
142 Mediterranean Quarterly: Fall 2005
claiming that it was the Greek Cypriots’ last, best chance, or to countenance that its
rejection was an example of the democracy that they are so vigorously championing
Britain, which has consistently pursued its objectives in Cyprus through formulas
that are ethnically divisive, even when alternate routes were available, ought now to be
seen as so profoundly self-interested as to have disqualifi ed itself from further involvement
in any process of disinterested solution seeking. Furthermore, Britain is the most
fervent supporter of Turkey’s accession to the EU. In that role it is keen to convince
other EU states that the Turkish occupation of northern areas of Cyprus, totally illegal
in international law and contrary to UN resolutions, should now be overlooked. Hannay
and his book, in contributing to this public relations process, proffer a holier-than-thou
attitude that will stick in the gullet of those with a genuine understanding of, and sympathy
for, the Cypriot people.
This book can be recommended for its excellent use of the English language, and
for a beguiling view of a top-down foreign effort at nation-building and for easy bedtime
reading. It should not, however, be seen as an aid to the understanding of the problems
of Cyprus, or as an effort to further convergence or reconciliation.
Alexander Kitroeff:Wrestling with the Ancients: Modern Greek Identity
and the Olympics.New York: Greekworks, 2004. 276 pages. ISBN
0-974660-0-3. $32.00. Reviewed by Constantine P. Danopoulos.
Since their founding in the 1890s by Baron Pierre de Coubertin, the modern Olympic
Games have received a fair amount of media and scholarly attention. Sociologists,
historians, and other sports enthusiasts have produced numerous works detailing and
analyzing the nature and importance of the ancient games, their evolution, the political
calculations surrounding post-1896 Olympiads, the effects of commercialization in the
staging of the games, the impact of performance-enhancement substances, and a host
of other issues. Spurred by pride in the fact that the Olympics began in ancient Greece,
contemporary Greek historians, archaeologists, and anthropologists generated a good
number of studies chronicling the nature and the evolution of the games, and used them
to praise the achievements of their ancient ancestors. Others wrote narratives describing
the fi rst two modern Olympiads (1896 and 1906), both held in Athens.
Despite their scholastic value, however, none of these works delves into the Olympic
Games’ contribution to the evolution of the modern Greek state, with respect to state-
Constantine P. Danopoulos is professor of political science at San Jose State University.
building and national-identity formation. Alexander Kitroeff’s sharp eye spotted the
void and labored to fi ll the missing link.Wrestling with the Ancients is an outstanding
piece of scholarship that is destined to become the standard work in the fi eld. The
editors and staff of Greekworks deserve credit for recognizing the timeliness and high
quality of Kitroeff’s work, as well as for working tenaciously to put out a text that is
eminently readable yet retains admirable scholarly value.
Kitroeff’s central thesis is that the revival of the Olympic Games afforded Greece an
opportunity to confront the issues of national identity and the nation’s connection and
relations with the outside world. In his words, Greece “experienced its dual identity, as
the heir to classical traditions and as a modernized, European state, through its role in
the international Olympic movement.” Athens viewed the games both “as an affi rmation
of its ancient heritage and as a means through which to gain international recognition.”
The parallel and largely successful pursuits of these dual-identity goals is responsible
for the “privileged place [Greece] managed to maintain in the international Olympic
While the convergence of ancient heritage and international recognition served
Greece’s interests, the nexus failed to satisfy the goals of de Coubertin and the International
Olympic Committee (IOC). Spurred by the conviction that the Olympics would be
a means to venerate the accomplishments of their glorious ancestors, successive Greek
governments saw the Olympics “as a celebration of ancient traditions colored by sport”
and, despite the country’s poor economic conditions, inaugurated a relentless campaign
to make Greece the permanent site of the Games. A philhellene and ardent admirer of
the classics, de Coubertin, along with the IOC, viewed the equation in reverse. For them
the “Olympics were conceived as a celebration of sport colored by ancient traditions.”
Greece’s aim to use the glory of the past to foster national identity and strengthen the
country’s international reputation ran contrary to de Coubertin’s concept of an Olympic
movement as an international athletic event imbued by ancient Hellenic values. As a
result, de Coubertin and his successors opposed the idea of making Greece the permanent
site for the games.
With the passage of time, the two sides drew different conclusions regarding the
importance of Greece to the Olympic movement. As Kitroeff argues, “still under
the grip of de Coubertin, [the IOC] remained attached to the earlier romantic views
of Greece,” and doubted the ability of the destitute modern Greek state to stage the
enlarged and increasingly more complex games. Yet in recognition of the “spirit of the
place,” the committee decided to have Greece march “fi rst in the opening parade of
nations”—a tradition consolidated during the 1932 Los Angeles Olympiad and maintained
At the same time, the holding of the fi rst few Olympiads in Athens served to
embolden Greek beliefs that they (modern Greeks) were “the rightful heirs to the classical
tradition.” This frame of thinking led Greek offi cials to make two ill-founded and
144 Mediterranean Quarterly: Fall 2005
damaging assumptions. The fi rst related to Greece’s role in the 1936 Berlin games. Nazi
propaganda venerated the ancient Greek civilization and coaxed the Hellenic Olympic
Committee to become “a willing participant in the German-Nazi appropriation of
ancient Greece in the context of the 1936 games,” arguably the “most controversial of
the twentieth century.” For in Kitroeff’s words, “The so-called Nazi Olympics involved
not only a brazen attempt to celebrate Aryan superiority but also [paid] homage to the
Olympic movement’s classical heritage.”
In addition, the view that the modern Greeks were the rightful heirs of the classics
led Greek Olympic and government offi cials to believe that the IOC would automatically
award the Centennial Olympiad (1996) to its birthplace. Citing concerns “over the economic
and organizational viability of the games and impressed by corporate infl uence,”
the IOC rejected Athens’ inadequately prepared bid and chose Atlanta instead. Much
to the Greeks’ surprise and consternation, respect for heritage and tradition could not
compete with effi ciency, imagination, and professionalism. Melina Mercouri expressed
Greek unhappiness when she stated that Coca-Cola had defeated the Parthenon. As
Kitroeff eloquently states, “The IOC reject[ed] history and tradition, and embrace[d]
the high-tech image of a New World Olympiad.”
Though defeated and unhappy, unabashed Greek offi cials learned valuable lessons,
which they applied successfully in their effort to host the 2004 Olympiad. They took
note that the 1996 bid was doomed because the “attempt had been defi cient, complacent,
and unable to address obvious weaknesses, such as security, smog, and transport.”
Under the new, modernizing, technocratic, and agenda-oriented government of Kostas
Semitis, Athens “launched [the 2004] bid by stressing its ability to organize the games
effi ciently while keeping the allusions to history and tradition in the background.” By
placing Gianna Angelopoulou-Daskalake at the helm of the bid committee, the socialist
prime minister chose “an able person who was a member of the opposition.” Semitis
sent a clear and reassuring message to the IOC: “[He] favored capable hands, irrespective
of political outlook.” The IOC was convinced that Athens had the wherewithal to
stage the twenty-eighth Olympiad and gave the city the nod. Athens prevailed “because
it was able to reassure the committee that its infrastructure and organizational ability
could support the games.”
But the victory almost turned pyrrhic, as infrastructure building and other preparation
was delayed by bureaucratic squabbles, lack of organization, and sloppy management.
By early 2000, members of the IOC were sounding warning bells. IOC president
Juan Antonio Samaranch “delivered an unprecedented public rebuke.” In a 20 October
meeting with Greek offi cials, “he said that the games were in the worst organizational
crisis faced by an Olympic city in his twenty-year tenure.” Other IOC offi cials suggested
that Athens “was running out of time” and dropped hints that the games might
be moved to another site. The newly reelected Semitis government heeded IOC warnings
and took measures to speed up preparations. The return of Angelopoulou-Dakalaks
at the helm, a more active role by Semitis, and greater coordination by the relevant
ministers suffi ced to regain the lost ground. Although Kitroeff’s book went to press
before the summer 2004 games were held, the world witnessed a very successful
The Athens games proved that tradition and modernity can be molded into a single
successful formula. This combination has served the Olympic movement well, enabling
the games to survive the vagaries of Nazism, World War II, and the Cold War. Tradition,
Kitroeff claims, has enabled the IOC to cloak the movement with an “ideological
legitimacy provided by ancient traditions, [of which] Greece remains an important
part.” While the Olympic movement has been able to strike a relatively successful balance
between tradition and modernity, the 2004 games “challenge[d] Greece to fi nd
the right equilibrium between past and present.” Kitroeff concludes that contemporary
Greece’s “contribution to the Olympic movement is a given, because the games are
part of the heritage of the classical past, and thus one way or another, a core element of
Greek identity.” The phenomenal success of the Athens Olympiad is living proof that
moderns are capable of blending tradition and modernity.
Brendan O’Leary, John McGarry, and Khaled Salih, eds.,The Future of
Kurdistan in Iraq, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005. 307 pages. ISBN
0-8122-3870-2. $45.00. Reviewed by Robert Olson.
When more than one hundred London-based diplomats, politicians, journalists, and
international affairs analysts turn out for a discussion of a book, one knows that the
book is timely and has something to say about pressing current international affairs and
about its topic’s potential for impacting regional and international geopolitical alignments.
This is what happened on 31 May 2005 at Chatham House, a British think tank
associated closely with the United Kingdom’s Foreign Ministry. The book discussed
wasThe Future of Kurdistan in Iraq, edited by Brendan O’Leary, John McGarry, and
Khaled Salih. O’Leary is a noted international authority on various types of governmental
arrangements, such as federations, confederations, and plurifederations. McGarry is
a Canadian academic who specializes in the same topics, and Salih is a Kurdish scholar
who teaches at the University of Southern Denmark at Odense. Both O’Leary and Salih
spent several months in early 2004 in Kurdistan, Iraq, as advisers to the Kurdistan
Regional Government (KRG) participating in the drafting of the Transitional Administrative
Law (TAL), which has been the government instrument of Iraq, although not
fully implemented, since it went into effect on 8 March 2004. The TAL was scheduled
Robert Olson is professor of Middle East politics and history at the University of Kentucky.
146 Mediterranean Quarterly: Fall 2005
to be replaced by an Iraq-wide assembly, elected no later than 31 January 2005, obviously
a date that was not met.
The task at hand for O’Leary et al. is to “right-size” Iraq, that is, to make the state of
Iraq more compatible to the various ethnic, religious, and linguistic groups, resulting in
better management of the state, reduced hostility, and lessened armed confl ict and violence
and to secure a more stable political and geopolitical entity. All three co-authors
and their major contributors, such as Peter Galbraith and Gareth Stansfi eld, apply their
wide experience with multinational and plurinational states to the evolving question of
the future of Iraq and, in particular in this study, Kurdistan in Iraq.
The title notably emphasizes the future of Kurdistan in Iraq and not Kurdistan Iraq
or Kurdistan-Iraq, which indicates the preference of the contributors and especially,
O’Leary, since he wrote or co-authored four of the main chapters dealing with plurifederation.
The title implies that, at least for the time being, the contributors think that
a “unifi ed” Iraq would best serve the interests of the peoples of Iraq, especially the
Kurds, and implicitly the geopolitical and geostrategic interests of the United States
and Europe as well as Middle East states, with the exception of Iran. If, in the future,
Iran were to fragment and the success of the Kurdish nationalist movement in Iraq were
to be one of the factors contributing to that fragmentation, such a development would
probably be acceptable to the contributors of this volume. But, if this were to be the
case, then the plurifederalism advocated would be jeopardized.
The principal theoretical projection of the book is in chapters 2 and 4, written or coauthored
by O’Leary. As mentioned above, O’Leary was and is an adviser to the KRG
and participated in the drafting of the TAL. Why advocate a plurinational federation
for Iraq instead of a multinational federation? Because, says O’Leary, “A ‘plurinational’
federation describes a state in which there are multiple and recognized nations, whose
respective nationals may be both concentrated and dispersed, and in which individuals
may identify with one, more than one, or none of these nations.” The prefi xpluri helpfully
describes cases of “not one”; that is, it covers both two and more and suggests that
national identity or identities may be variable in intensity and that the federation may
comprise both confl icting and compatible identities. Multinational federation, by contrast,
is often interpreted as indicating spatially discrete and homogeneously adjacent
nations, as requiring three or more nations, as suggesting that each national identity is
held exclusively and that each national has only one national identity possessed with
the same intensity. The TAL foreshadows a plurinational federation.
Kurdistan in Iraq, stipulates O’Leary, also must be a consensual federation that has
inclusive executive power-sharing and representative arrangements in the federal
government, institutionalizes proportional principles of representation and
allocation of powers, bills of rights, monetary institutions and courts, which are
insulated from the immediate power of a federal governing majority. A consensual
federation differs from a majoritarian federation, which concentrates power at the
federal level and facilitates executive and legislative dominance either through a
popularly endorsed executive president or through a single-party prime minister
and cabinet which has the confi dence of the federal house of representatives.
O’Leary believes a consensual federation for Iraq would provide the best protection
for minorities, such as Turkomans, Assyrians, and Chaldeans (Keldanis) as well
as Kurds. He does not state, however, whether he would also advocate a consensual
federation for an independent Kurdish state were one to be realized. In short, O’Leary’s
chapters, like McGarry’s (the latter bases his analysis of Iraq on the Canadian experience
of federation), seek to maximize the protection of the Kurds from any future potential
nationalist or military challenge from Arabs—Iraqi Arabs or otherwise but, within
Iraq, especially from the Shia. Notably, however, McGarry stresses that in Canada
the decentralized federation experiment embedded in the Westminister (majoritarian)
model of government “has been based as much on a spirit of elite accommodation as on
facilitative institutional rules”—an elite accommodation, McGarry could have added,
facilitated by substantial availability of capital and the potential to accrue more capital.
This is a topic not addressed throughout the book. This, in turn, raises a question that
is addressed, namely, that the violence and armed confl ict in Iraq may prohibit the
kind of elite accommodation enabling plurinational federation to adequately function.
Moreover, Canada’s multimajoritarian federalism is a much less complicated system by
which to rule than the plurinational federation advocated by O’Leary for Iraq.
Gareth Stansfi eld, in his contribution, is not as sanguine that the Kurdistan Democratic
Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), because of traditional
and strong rivalry, will be able to meet the requisites of plurinational federalism. He
recommends that the KDP and PUK should concentrate on resolving the existing division
between them. But O’Leary, possibly more in tune with the geopolitical objectives
of the United States and Europe, argues that several features of the TAL, such as the
number of governates (muhafaza), elections, and prospective party law, would compel
the leadership of the KDP and PUK to be more cooperative. In this regard, O’Leary,
writing in early 2004, seems to have been on target in his analysis in that the KDP and
PUK announced in June 2005 that the KDP- and PUK-administered territories would
come sometime soon under the authority (prime ministership?) of Masud Barzani, the
leader of the KDP; his PUK rival, Jalal Talabani, at this time is president of Iraq.
The crux ofThe Future of Kurdistan in Iraq is clearly based on the TAL crafted
and drafted by scores of American, British, Arab, and Kurdish legal experts and by
scholars of federation systems such as O’Leary to provide the greatest possible protection
to the Kurds regardless of what happens in Iraq. But O’Leary, quoting Peter
Galbraith, states that “the US failed to protect the TAL for two main reasons: one, the
incompetence of the occupation authority’s legal advisers not to realize that Bremer’s
148 Mediterranean Quarterly: Fall 2005
decrees (and there were thousands of them) would not outlast the occupation; and, two,
the American (Pentagon?) preference to defer to majoritarian and anti-federal opinions
among Shia Arabs led by Ayatollah al Sistani, who consistently strongly opposed the
federal and ratifi cation proposals that the Kurds and their advisers sought to embed in
the TAL. Many of the plans to implement the TAL went awry as Galbraith and O’Leary,
in a postscript, make clear.
The Future of Kurdistan in Iraqhas some ironies. On the one hand, we have scores
of American advisers to the Kurds who were instrumental in crafting and drafting the
TAL, whose main purpose was to guarantee to the greatest possible extent the protection
of the Kurds within a thinly disguised “unifi ed” Iraq state (leaving aside the viability
of such a state to endure). On the other hand, we have scores of Pentagon, intelligence,
and other American administration offi cials who felt compelled to declare publicly (we
don’t yet know what their privately stated goals were, although we can deduce that the
preservation of a unifi ed Iraq over a longer term was not one of them) that one of their
goals was to preserve a “unifi ed” Iraq. For a government like that of the United States
to announce, or even to leave the public impression, that the object of the war against
Iraq and the occupation of that country was to create a set of circumstances in which
Iraq would be fragmented into an Arab and Kurdish entity would be analogous to the
circumstances that led to the creation of Israel after the thirty-one-year (1917 to 1948)
British mandatory period.
A further criticism ofThe Future of Kurdistan in Iraq, with the exception of Michael
Gunter’s chapter on Turkey (which is also sparse), is the little attention paid to Iran
or Syria or other of Iraq’s neighbors such as Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait—all
largely Sunni countries, which are vital for a viable Iraq to endure whether the TAL, or
portions thereof, are implemented or not. As John McGarry emphasized in his contribution,
it is not laws, no matter how fi nely crafted, that determine the success of any type
of federation or, indeed, government; it is the “spirit of elite accommodation.” Given the
violence in Iraq among the elite, accommodation among them will be diffi cult.
Another weakness of the book is that it does not contextualize the objectives the
United States seeks to obtain via its Wider Middle East Initiative (WMEI), through
which democratization of Arab countries is to be implemented by the imposition of pro-
American governments with internationally driven capital development plans and economic
systems. One of the major goals of the WMEI is to expedite further the integration
of the Arab economies with that of international capital and Israel’s economy. Such
a development would ensure the security of Israel well into the future even as it persists
in expanding into the West Bank. This is one of the major reasons for the invasion and
occupation of Iraq and for the subsequent necessity of drafting the TAL.
The book also has two important appendices: Kurdistan’s Constitutional Proposal
and the TAL.The Future of Kurdistan in Iraq well deserves the prestigious turnout it
produced at Chatham House.
ΕΤΟΣ 51ο ΑΡΙΘΜΟΣ ΦΥΛΛΟΥ: 17310
Κυριακή, 23 Δεκεμβρίου 2007
Απόρρητα της ελληνικής ΚΥΠ για τα πρώτα βήματα της Κ. Δημοκρατίας
TOY MAΡΙΟΥ ΕΥΡΥΒΙΑΔΗ
Δύο εξαιρετικά βιβλία για τη σύγχρονη ιστορία της Κύπρου κυκλοφορούν, κατά μία περίεργη συγκυρία, την περίοδο αυτή στην αγορά. Το ένα είναι του Μάνου Ηλιάδη, Το Απόρρητο Ημερολόγιο της ΚΥΠ στην Κύπρο (Εκδόσεις Σιδέρης) που καλύπτει τη δεκαεπτάμηνη περίοδο 13 Ιουνίου 1959 μέχρι και τις 28 Νοεμβρίου 1960. Το άλλο είναι του Martin Packard, Getting it Wrong: Fragments from a Cyprus Diary 1964 (2007). Το βιβλίο του Ηλιάδη βασίζεται σε 80 απόρρητες εκθέσεις της Eλληνικής Yπηρεσίας Πληροφοριών (ΚΥΠ) που δρούσε στην Κύπρο τότε και τα οποία δημοσιοποιούνται στο βιβλίο. Το πόνημα του Packard βασίζεται στην πολυσέλιδη αναφορά του προς τις Βρετανικές Υπηρεσίες, ως μέλος της αρχικά βρετανικής ειρηνευτικής δύναμης που αναπτύχθηκε στην Κύπρο στις αρχές του 1964 και η οποία μετεξελίχθηκε στη γνωστή μας ΟΥΝΦΙΚΥΠ. Και τα δύο βιβλία περιέχουν και βασίζονται σε πρωτογενές υλικό. Και στις δύο περιπτώσεις το πρωτογενές υλικό και οι εκτιμήσεις των συγγραφέων ανατρέπουν τη συμβατική σοφία και τις ιδεοληπτικές και επιδερμικές προσεγγίσεις για τα τεκταινόμενα στην Κύπρο την περίοδο1959-1964. Και στις δύο περιπτώσεις το πρωτογενές αυτό υλικό δεν θα έβλεπε ποτέ τη δημοσιότητα εάν οι συγγραφείς δεν έδειχναν ιδιαίτερο ζήλο, υπομονή, επιμονή, μόχθο αλλά και προσωπικό ρίσκο. Στην περίπτωση του Packard ο άνθρωπος έχασε την στρατιωτική του καριέρα, κυνηγήθηκε ανελέητα από το βρετανικό κράτος (και από τους Αμερικανούς) και καταστράφηκε οικονομικά. Ποιο το αμάρτημά του; Πίστεψε και απέδειξε με τη δράση του το 1964, ότι οι Ελληνοκύπριοι και Τουρκοκύπριοι μπορούν να διαβιώσουν ειρηνικά στην Κύπρο. Κάτι τέτοιο έρχονταν σε μετωπική σύγκρουση με την ήδη ειλημμένη απόφαση της Ουάσιγκτον και του Λονδίνου, με την οποία συμφωνούσαν Ελλάδα και Τουρκία ότι η, έστω και κολοβή, ανεξαρτησία που δόθηκε στην Κύπρο ήταν στρατηγικό λάθος και ότι το Κυπριακό Κράτος έπρεπε πάραυτα να καταλυθεί. Η απάντηση που εισέπραξε ο Packard, επιμένοντας στη συμφιλίωση ως στρατηγική επίλυσης του Κυπριακού, από έναν εκ των αρχιτεκτόνων των σχεδίων για την κατάλυση του Κυπριακού Κράτους, τον Αμερικανό Αναπληρωτή Υπουργού Εξωτερικών George Ball, ήταν ότι κατάλαβε λάθος την αποστολή του. Στόχος των Δυτικών Δυνάμεων που αναπτύχθηκαν στην Κύπρο το 1964 δεν ήταν, του δήλωσε κυνικά, η συμφιλίωση, αλλά η κατάλυση του κράτους και ο διαμελισμός του νησιού. Στην περίπτωση Ηλιάδη, το βιβλίο του είναι μοναδικό. Μέσα από τα πληροφοριακά δελτία , σημειώματα και εκθέσεις της ΚΥΠ, που είχαν ως τελικούς αποδέκτες τον Πρωθυπουργό και Υπουργό Εξωτερικών της Ελλάδας, ξεπροβάλλουν άγνωστες πτυχές της πολιτικής ιστορίας της Κύπρου. Η μοναδικότητα του βιβλίου προέρχεται και από το γεγονός ότι όλα όσα καταγράφονται είναι προσωποποιημένα. Αναφέρονται εκατοντάδες ονόματα Ελληνοκυπρίων και Τουρκοκυπρίων σε συσχετισμό με δραστηριότητες που θεωρούνταν αξιόλογες προς καταγραφή. Η δε ημερολογιακή δομή των δελτίων κυριολεκτικά αναβιώνει το «κλίμα της εποχής», τις δράσεις, τους ρόλους και τα κίνητρα των δρώντων μέσα και έξω από την Κύπρο. Μέσα από το σύνολο των Εκθέσεων υπάρχουν, βέβαια, και πολιτικές σκοπιμότητες τις οποίες ο κάθε νοήμων αναγνώστης μπορεί να αντιληφθεί και οι οποίες αναδεικνύονται από τον ίδιο τον συγγραφέα μέσα από το δικό του σχολιασμό. Μια από τις σκοπιμότητες αυτές, η πιο σημαντική κατά την εκτίμησή μου, ήταν και η εσκεμμένη υποβάθμιση, ή αλλιώς, η μη ανάπτυξη θεμάτων και γεγονότων υπό τη μορφή «σχολίων» και «εκτιμήσεων», που έρχονταν σε αντίθεση με το «πνεύμα της Ζυρίχης - Λονδίνου». Η πολιτική ηγεσία της Ελλάδας δεν ήθελε, προφανώς, να ακούσει, έστω και για δική της εσωτερική ενημέρωση, οτιδήποτε αμφισβητούσε το πνεύμα αυτό. Η πιο κραυγαλέα από τις σκοπιμότητες αυτές ήταν η «αγνόηση» της πραγματικά απίστευτης σε πληρότητα τεκμηρίωσης της ΚΥΠ, με λεπτομέρειες που μας αφήνουν άναυδους, της αχαλίνωτης και απρόσκοπτης δραστηριότητας του επίσημου τουρκικού κράτους, των υπηρεσιών του και των Τουρκοκυπρίων, για την εισαγωγή οπλισμού στην Κύπρο την περίοδο αυτή. Οι εισαγωγές δεν προήρχοντο μόνο από την Τουρκία αλλά και από τις διεθνείς αγορές όπως για παράδειγμα, αυτή του Λιβάνου. Το πασίγνωστο επεισόδιο της εισαγωγής όπλων από την Τουρκία με το πλοιάριο Ντενίζ, (νηολόγιο Σμύρνης) στις 18 Οκτωβρίου 1959 αποτελούσε, όπως προκύπτει από τα ντοκουμέντα, την κορυφή του παγόβουνου. Τη δεκαεπτάμηνη περίοδο των εκθέσεων της ΚΥΠ η εισαγωγή οπλισμού από την Τουρκία διαπιστώνεται ως σχεδόν «καθημερινό» φαινόμενο το οποίο λάμβανε χώρα και εν γνώσει των Βρετανών. Οι τελευταίοι σε ατομικό επίπεδο εκπαίδευαν τους Τουρκοκύπριους στα όπλα συνήθως τα βράδια και τους πούλησαν οπλισμό. Κατά τους υπολογισμούς της ΚΥΠ, προερχόμενους από αγγλικές πηγές, το Ντενίζ μετέφερε 5-8 τόνους πυρομαχικών. Ο συνολικός δε αριθμός των όπλων που οι Τούρκοι εισήγαγαν στην Κύπρο, πάντοτε κατά τους υπολογισμούς της ΚΥΠ, ήταν περίπου 10.000 τεμάχια. Η Έκθεση της ΚΥΠ της 21ης Οκτωβρίου 1960, λίγο δηλαδή μετά την ανακήρυξη της ανεξαρτησίας, είναι διαφωτιστικότατη: «Κατά το εξάμηνον διάστημα μεταξύ Ιανουαρίου 1959 - Ιουλίου 1959, λαθραίως εισήχθησαν υπό των Τουρκοκυπρίων 6000 όπλα, ήτοι βαρέα πολυβόλα, οπλοπολυβόλα, τυφέκια, πιστόλια και περίστροφα, ως και όλμοι των 2 και τριών ιντσών, ανελθόντος ούτω, κατά Ιούνιον 1959, του αριθμού των υπό της Τουρκικής Κοινότητος κατεχομένων όπλων εις 7.000, μετά μεγάλου αριθμού σφαιρών». «Μετά τον Ιούλιον του 1959 και μέχρι 2 Σεπτεμβρίου 1960 εσυνεχίσθη εις μεγάλην έκτασιν η λαθραία εισαγωγή όπλων και πυρομαχικών υπό των Τουρκοκυπρίων, ώστε σήμερον να πιστεύεται ότι οι Τουρκοκύπριοι διαθέτουν όπλα ανερχόμενα εις 10.000 περίπου τεμάχια». Εξοπλίστηκε δύναμη 10 χιλιάδων ανδρών Το ακριβές των τότε εκτιμήσεων της ΚΥΠ επιβεβαιώθηκε τριάντα πέντε χρόνια αργότερα σε σειρά δημοσιευμάτων στον τουρκικό τύπο (υπό τη μορφή απομνημονευμάτων Τούρκων αξιωματικών και αξιωματούχων) για τις δραστηριότητες της τουρκοκυπριακής οργάνωσης ΤΜΤ που ήταν και αυτή όπως και άλλες υπό τον άμεσο έλεγχο Τούρκων αξιωματικών που οργάνωναν και επέβλεπαν την εξοπλιστική δραστηριότητα (βλ. Milliyet, 11.6.1995). Όπως προκύπτει από τα δημοσιεύματα στη φάση αυτή του εξοπλισμού των Τουρκοκυπρίων, επιτεύχθηκε ο στόχος του εξοπλισμού δύναμης 10.000 ανδρών. «Τι τα θέλουν τα όπλα οι Τούρκοι αφού οι συμφωνίες τους παρέχουν όλα τα εχέγγυα, τα διασφαλίζοντα τα δικαιώματά τους εντός των πλαισίων της νέας Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας» σχολίαζε, κατ' εξαίρεση, η Έκθεση της ΚΥΠ για την περίοδο 9/11/59 - 16/11/1959. Προφανώς, πέραν της ΚΥΠ κανείς δεν ήθελε να θέσει ένα τέτοιο ενοχλητικό ερώτημα πόσω δε μάλλον να το απαντήσει. Κάτι τέτοιο δεν θα ήταν «πολιτικά ορθό» διότι θα ερχόταν σε αντίθεση με το «πνεύμα Ζυρίχης - Λονδίνου» που μονομερώς και εργολαβικά καλλιεργούσε η Αθήνα. Αποκαλύψεις για την πρώτη προεδρική εκλογή Μια άλλη σκοπιμότητα που εντοπίζεται στην ημερολογιακή καταγραφή και αξιολόγηση των γεγονότων από την ΚΥΠ, ήταν και η αντικομουνιστική προκατάληψη των συγγραφέων των Εκθέσεων. Το γεγονός αυτό αναδεικνύεται από τον συγγραφέα αφού τοποθετεί τις δραστηριότητες και την αντικομουνιστική προσέγγιση της ΚΥΠ στο ιστορικό της πλαίσιο στην Ελλάδα μετά τον εμφύλιο πόλεμο. Θα ήταν ωστόσο μέγα λάθος εάν η «Κομμουνιστική Δραστηριότης» που καταγράφεται στις Εκθέσεις απορριφθεί εκ προοιμίου διότι πηγάζει από αντικομουνιστές ή ακροδεξιούς αναλυτές. Οι Εκθέσεις καταγράφουν εξαιρετικά ενδιαφέρουσες εξελίξεις, καταστάσεις, πρόσωπα και πράγματα, όπως κατά την προεδρική προεκλογική περίοδο, για παράδειγμα, που ίσως να βλέπουν το φως της δημοσιότητας για πρώτη φορά. Τα γεγονότα και οι εξελίξεις που καταγράφονται από την ΚΥΠ θα πρέπει να αντιπαρατεθούν με τα γεγονότα της εποχής και να ελεγχθούν, εφόσον συγκρούονται με αυτά. Εάν υπάρχει κάτι το παρήγορο στην ταλαιπωρημένη ιστορία αυτού του τόπου, αυτό είναι το θαύμα της επιβίωσης του Κυπριακού Κράτους σε πείσμα όλων, μέσα και έξω από την Κύπρο, που ανέλαβαν εργολαβικά να το διαλύσουν πριν ακόμη ιδρυθεί. Σταδιακά, με αξιόλογα έργα όπως αυτά των Ηλιάδη και Packard, μαθαίνουμε την πραγματική πολιτική ιστορία του τόπου μας.
From: "American Hellenic Institute" <email@example.com>
To: "American Hellenic Institute" <firstname.lastname@example.org>
Subject: Book Review by Nicholas G. Karambelas Published in The Washington Lawyer Magazine
Date: Tue, 28 Feb 2006 16:26:47 -0500
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE CONTACT: Georgia Economou
February 28, 2006 (202) 785-8430
The Washington Lawyer Magazine
Washington, DC —The following book review by AHI Advisory Committee Member and Legal Counsel Nicholas G. Karambelas appears in the March 2006 issue of The Washington Lawyer Magazine.
An International Relations Debacle
The UN Secretary-General’s Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus 1999–2004
By Claire Palley
Review by Nicholas G. KarambelasAptly titled, An International Relations Debacle by Claire Palley documents in exhaustive detail the most recent initiative to solve the Cyprus issue. Named after United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan, the Annan Plan went through five incarnations between 1999 and 2004, culminating in separate referenda held by the Turkish Cypriot minority and the Greek Cypriot majority in April 2004. The Turkish Cypriots approved the plan by 65 to 35 percent, whereas the Greek Cypriots disapproved by 76 to 24 percent. The Annan Plan did not take effect because it required the approval of both communities. The Annan Plan is the latest in a series of failed attempts by non-Cypriot international actors to impose a governing structure and political process on the people who inhabit Cyprus. These failures began in 1878 when the Ottoman Empire ceded Cyprus to Great Britain and continued after Cyprus became a British crown colony in 1914 and into the Zurich Agreements under which the Republic of Cyprus was established and granted a stunted form of independence in 1960. After Turkey invaded Cyprus in 1974 and began its illegal occupation of one-third of Cyprus, a succession of mediators from the United States, United Kingdom, and United Nations proposed plans to reunify Cyprus. In 1983 Turkey created a geopolitical entity in occupied Cyprus referred to as the Turkish Federated State of Northern Cyprus, which has purported to act as a state but which no other nation in the world, including the US, recognizes. Fundamentally, the Annan Plan established a predominantly Greek constituent state and a predominantly Turkish constituent state each of which would compose a unified state with some form of federal government. Like each of the previous attempts, the Annan Plan failed because the drafters consciously ignored three basic principles of Western political philosophy: (1) each citizen possesses fundamental rights that enable him or her to participate in governing; (2) representatives elected by the majority of the citizens govern; and (3) an independent judiciary protects the rights of any minority of citizens and enforces the property rights of all citizens. Instead of providing a political structure based on these principles, the political structure set forth in the Annan Plan, as well as in each previous plan, enabled the Turkish Cypriots to exercise an absolute veto over fundamental governing decisions. Using the absolute veto, the Turkish Cypriot minority could effectively stall the entire governing processes of the nation. No Western nation has a political process in which a minority of any kind has that kind of absolute veto. By abjuring such fundamental principles of democracy, the Annan Plan drafters effectively assured that it would fail. The drafters committed a similar error in the manner in which they purported to resolve the property issue. One of the most pernicious effects of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus is that the Turkish military has displaced the rightful owners of real property in occupied Cyprus, a number of whom are U.S. citizens. Since 1974 Turkey has encouraged and abetted the possession and use of this property by Turkish Cypriots. Turkey has also imported many Turks from Turkey and settled them on the land of displaced owners, contrary to every applicable treaty and norm of international law. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) of the Council of Europe has expressly ruled in several cases that the only rightful owners of that property are persons who hold title under the laws of the Republic of Cyprus and that Turkey is responsible for wrongfully displacing and excluding these owners from their property. Despite this clear jurisprudence, the Annan Plan established a highly complicated, ambiguous, and uncertain regime for resolving property matters. The regime was clearly designed to limit the number of displaced owners who could repossess their property. It required all claims asserted by displaced owners in the ECHR to be withdrawn, and that any displaced owner aggrieved as a result to seek redress from its constituent state. Because the overwhelming majority of displaced owners are Greek Cypriots, the practical effect of this provision would have required Greek Cypriots to pay the cost of the consequences of the Turkish invasion and continued occupation. From the facts recounted in the book about how the Annan Plan developed, it is easy to blame Kofi Annan for the deficiencies in the plan. Certainly, the reported record of the Annan administration makes him “low hanging fruit” for assigning to him responsibility for any UN failure. It is also easy to blame the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots and the centuries of animosity between Greeks and Turks. However, the concepts underlying the Annan Plan as well as the poor draftsmanship of the actual text of the plan betray the hand of British, American, and other diplomats who were simply out of their depth. The Annan Plan reeks of diplomats conjuring up pet theories of a consociational federation without regard to the individuals who must live with the results long after the diplomats have moved on to the next embassy reception. Diplomats should stick to negotiating and drafting treaties and other international agreements between governments. Constitutions and other documents which adjust the rights and obligations of individuals that must ultimately be vindicated or enforced in a court are the province of practicing attorneys, not diplomats with law degrees. Diplomats refer to ambiguous and vague provisions in a legal document as compromises. Practicing attorneys refer to such provisions as lawsuits. Palley sees new opportunities for cooperation within the context of the European Union (EU). The Republic of Cyprus joined the EU on May 1, 2004. If the reunification of Cyprus is to occur at all, it will only occur within the context of the EU. The very legal rights, protections, and guarantees that the Turkish Cypriots claim will be denied to them in a reunified Republic of Cyprus are embodied in the three pillars of the EU, which are collectively referred to as the acquis communautaire. Yet, as the result of the continuing Turkish military occupation, the Cyprus accession documents state that the acquis communautaire is suspended in those portions of Cyprus occupied by Turkey. The Charter of Fundamental Freedoms and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, enforced, respectively, through the EU courts and the ECHR, can serve to safeguard the rights of the Turkish Cypriots in the same way in which the U.S. Bill of Rights and the U.S. federal courts have safeguarded the rights of minorities in the United States. The future of the Turkish Cypriots lies in their becoming full-fledged EU citizens. That will only occur when Cyprus is reunified based on the fundamental principles of Western political philosophy as reflected in the EU acquis communautaire. Beyond Cyprus, the strength of the book is that it provides an intimate firsthand view by a participant of international deal making, otherwise referred to as sausage making. Palley served as a consultant to the president of Cyprus during the period about which she writes. Because it focuses on the 1999–2004 period, the book does not contain much historical or political background, which is crucial to understanding how the Cyprus issue has evolved. Consequently, this is not the first book on Cyprus for the interested researcher or policymaker to read. However, it is an excellent and sobering case study of nation building at the international level. It should be required reading for the peoples of Iraq.
Nicholas G. Karambelas is a partner in Sfikas & Karambelas, LLP.
Hannay’s misleading diplomacy
By Philippos Stylianou
The latest reappearance in Cyprus of Lord David Hannay to attend the Wilton Park conference and sign copies of his book on the Annan Plan were seen as the first concrete effort to relaunch the plan after its overwhelming rejection by the Greek Cypriots in the April 24 referendum last year.
This is after all the clear message of Hannay’s book, the first ever he wrote in his 44-year career in the British diplomatic service. Unfortunately, his first authorial attempt is as flawed as the plan that bears his hallmark so clearly and if the book is any contribution to Cyprus it is in helping the reader to understand how such an unacceptable solution was put before the Greek Cypriots, who had every right to expect something better after all they have been through.
Notwithstanding that he has never written a book on anything before, the budding author starts by making the outrageous assertion in his introduction that his work is the only impartial one that ever came out on the Cyprus problem.
He writes off everybody else with these words: “Most of what has been written about Cyprus has been the work of members of one or the other of the two embattled communities (...) As such they are at best distorted by that prism, at worst little better than polemic and propaganda. And the non-Cypriots who have ventured into the field seem to have fallen prey to the same distortions...”
Such was the sorry state of world bibliography on Cyprus until Lord Hannay came along to show the way: “ So, for someone who has always been a student of history, it was tempting to try to redress the balance a little.”
Such a claim invites criticism not only because it lacks modesty but more importantly because it comes from someone who wrote about his involvement in Cyprus as a member of the British Diplomatic Service and Special Representative of Her Majesty’s Government.
Knowing that Britain had been the colonial ruler of Cyprus for 82 years and still enjoys two military bases on the island, while also being one of its three quarantor powers, it takes nerve on Hannay’s part to even suggest that he can be impartial and unbiased.
Besides, the novice writer gives himself away on page 107 where, in describing how the various players were gearing up for the new negotiations, he writes: “For the UK, Cyprus itself mattered a good deal both for historical reasons and the continuing presence of the Sovereign Base areas on the island..”
He must think his readers very naive if he expects them to believe that serving UK interests was not part of his job.
There will be more on what Hannay’s real Cyprus job was, but let’s for the time being give him the benefit of the doubt and see how impartial he really is.
The first chapter of his book is a nine-page historical background which teems with inaccuracies, distortions of facts, deliberate generalisations and downright lies. Probably aware of this, Hannay tries to cover up his trail by stating that “that chapter is neither an original product, nor is it the fruit of deep historical research, but the minimum needed to assist comprehension of the negotiation itself.” This, however, does not explain how and why all the inaccuracies, distortions, generalisations and lies paint the Greek Cypriots in a negative colour and present the Turkish Cypriots as always the victims.
Referring to the EOKA anticolonial campaing of the 1950s, Hannay writes that the Turkish Cypriots were “attacked and harassed” by their “Greek Cypriot neighbours”, whilst in reality the reverse was the case. It was the Turkish Cypriots who attacked and murdered the Greek Cypriots, either as members of the security forces or as mobs who burnt and looted Greek neighbourhoods under a big colonial yawn.
Hannay also heaps all the responsibility for the communal confrontation in 1963 on to the Greek Cypriots for wanting to “push through unconstitutionally a number of constitutional amendments”. Had Lord Hannay as “someone who has always been a student of history,” taken the trouble to pick up the book “My Deposition” by former President Glafkos Clerides, whom he has no reason to mistrust, he would have found out how President Makarios had been encouraged in his move to amend the Cyprus constitution by the British government.
Had he done so, he could have perhaps been interested to find out where all the related documents have since disappeared to from the Foreign Office and the British High Commission in Nicosia.
Still on the same historical period, Hannay claims that the “Cyprus National Guard, the Republic’s army, was entirely Greek Cypriot in composition and accordingly partisan.” To outsiders this sounds like the murderous Greeks had all the military power in their hands and again began to sloughter the poor Turks. In fact there was no National Guard when the intercommunal conflict flared up. The infant Republic’s army, called the Cyprus Army, to be composed of both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, never really got off the ground.
The National Guard was hastily put together in the face of the dangerous situation in the summer of 1964, just in time to check Turkey’s first attempt to invade the island. There is, of course, no mention of the naplam bombs that rained on Greek villages by the Turkish airforce, killing scores of civilians.
Hannay’s blender of history really gets out of control and splashes him all over when he places the Greek Cypriot armed EOKA B organisation in the early 1960s together with the Turkish Cypriot TMT one and calls them both militias. The historic truth, of course, is that EOKA B was formed in 1972 and far from being a militia, it was trying to overthrow Makarios’ government and ended up being stooges to the Athens junta coup against him.
EOKA B never lifted a finger against the Turkish Cypriots, and the reason Hannay antedates it by more than a decade is probably to have a Greek Cypriot villain alongside TMT. The latter was formed by Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash in the late 1950s - according to his own proud admission - and became instrumental in starting the 1963 conflict by targeting both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. It was particularly active in forcing Turkish Cypriots to leave their villages and move into enclaves in the north, often smuggled inside UN trucks driven by British peacekeepers (see debate in the Cyprus House of Representatives).
And now we come to 1974 and the Turkish invasion, which according to Lord Hannay was prompted “by some high-profile attacks on Turkish Cypriot enclaves” by the Greek Cypriot putchists. This is a straight lie, of course, since not a single shot was fired against the Turkish Cypriots before the Attila landing started on Cyprus. To the contrary, the coupists, probably realising their folly, broadcasted frantic reassurances to the Turkish Cypriots for Ankara and the world to hear, that they had nothing to fear from them. Naturally, it was too late; Turkey had been waiting for years for the excuse to invade.
Hannay tells his readers that this amazing anthology of historical distortions and lies “is the minimum needed to assist comprehension of the negotiations (for the Annan Plan) itself.” Indeed, they are very helpful in understanding why the Annan plan - Hannay’s brain child - tilted so heavily against the Greek Cypriots and satisfied almost every demand of the Turkish Cypriots and Ankara.
There are, of course, other monuments to Hannay’s professed impartiality, besides the historical ones. He criticizes, for example, Cyprus Government efforts to enhance its defence capabilities by writing that “...arms purchases by the Government of Cyprus which, together with mounting Turkish deployments, had resulted in the island being one of the most heavily armed places on earth.”
Nothing, of course, about the 99-square mile British military bases in Cyprus whose arsenal also included atomic weapons.
Hannay also likes to refer to the Turkish settlers as “Turkish citizens” who popped over to the occupied north of the island for a casual job. This reminds one of a BBC report in the thick of the Turkish invasion in 1974 about an Israeli boat picking up 300 “Turkish citizens” off the western coast of Cyprus. They were in fact part of the crew of the Turkish destroyer “Kocatepe” sunk by their own airforce, which mistook it for a Greek navy boat.
A shocking instance of how the Greek Cypriots were misled and practically conned into accepting the process leading up to the Annan Plan is inadvertently revealed by Hannay on page 71 of his book. He writes that one of the obstacles in clearing the way for the big push on Cyprus was getting the government of Glafcos Clerides to abandon his plans to deploy the Russian S-300 missiles on the island in 1997. They argued that “the best form of security for the Greek Cypriots was an internationally guaranteed settlement and not the acquisition of additional weapons.”
Yet, there were no international guarantees in the settlement proposed by the Annan Plan, but a worse repetition of the old tripartite guarantees, leaving Cyprus exposed to arbitrary military action by Turkey at the slightest pretext. As everybody knows by now, this was one of the main reasons why the Greek Cypriots overwhelmingly rejected the Annan Plan.
In his book, Hannay sneers at the Cypriots for seeing British conspiracies all the time and sardonicallly remarks that there was none of this when Britain threw in 45% of its Bases to enhance the territorial proposals of the Annan Plan.
What he conceals, however, is that although most of the proposed territory was in the Dhekelia Base and much of it coastal, there was no sea to go with it. Not only Britain retained the exclusive use of the sea area of the Eastern SBA under the 1960 Treaty of Establishment, it also wanted to redraw its boundaries in such way as to correspond to coastal land that was to be given to the Turkish Cypriots and to the Greek Cypriots respectively. Why this and why be secretive about it? Could it be that the British had future plans about Dhekelia if the Annan Plan came to pass, such as abandoning it altogether? And to whom?
Naturally, there is no mention either of how the two so-called treaties between the pseudostate and Turkey that would practically bring the whole island under the direct control of the Turkish navy and which the Greek Cypriots knew nothing about when they voted in the April 24 referendum came to be embodied in the Annan plan. If they knew about this, the rejection would have been 100% and not 76%.
One could go on to write a book about Hannay’s extraordinary book on Cyprus, but it could be more appropriate at this point to hear his own definition of what his Cyprus job really was.
In his interview to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee, which in its recent inquiry report on Cyprus accorded Bible status to his book, Hannay explained how and why he was appointed United Kingdom’ Special Representative for Cyprus.
Quoting from page 50 of the report “... the British Government felt at the time, so they told me, that having committed themselves to Cyprus’ membership of the European Union and that having some quite tricky implications for the situation of the Eastern Mediterranean, it was really part of our duty to make a further effort, a further serious effort, to get a settlement to the Cyprus problem to obviate some of the tensions that would arise.”
The truth is out at last. Hanney was not appointed to work for a Cyprus solution that would cater for the genuine needs of its genuine people, but to tackle “tricky implications in the Eastern Mediterranean” and “obviate tensions.”
This finally explains the intricate provisions of the Annan Plan masterminded by Hannay which made a parody of Cyprus’ EU membership and an empty shell of the proposed new state’s sovereignty.
It is regrettable that the arrogance, conceit and unashamed deception displayed by the former UK Cyprus representative in his first ever published work does not permit either a milder criticism or a more dignified writing style. Besides, it would be unfair to the increasing number of British historians, journalists and politicians who are writing and speaking out the truth about Cyprus and are so scornfully dismissed by Hannay.
Χάνεϊ, ο λάθος άνθρωπος στην αναζήτηση λύσεων
Ο Λόρδος Χάνεϊ έχει γράψει ένα πολύ
ευκολοδιάβαστο βιβλίο. Είναι όμως λυπηρό, ότι αυτό το βιβλίο δεν προσφέρει
τίποτε το αξιόλογο στη συζήτηση για το Κυπριακό ζήτημα. Ξεκινώντας από μια
λανθασμένη αντίληψη της Κυπριακής ιστορίας, προχωρά με διασκεδαστικό τρόπο
σε λανθασμένα συμπεράσματα. Το ότι κάπου στη μέση του βιβλίου εμφανίζονται
αποσπάσματα από το ημερολόγιό του, που έχουν ψήγματα αντικειμενικότητας, δεν
αφαιρεί καθόλου από την υποκειμενικότητα του έργου στο σύνολό του.
Οπωσδήποτε θα βλάψει το ζήτημα της Κύπρου, και ίσως βοηθήσει το Λονδίνο στο
να στρέψει αλλού την προσοχή της διεθνούς γνώμης παρά στην πραγματικότητα
των προβλημάτων που έχουν επιβληθεί στην Κύπρο. Θα ισχυροποιήσει επίσης, την
αντίληψη στην Κύπρο ότι η αγγλική γραφειοκρατία (Whitehall) θα πρέπει να
σταματήσει να εμφανίζει εαυτήν ως ικανό ερμηνευτή των Κυπριακών υποθέσεων.
Claire Palley: Turkey must solve the Cyprus question
by Maria Myles
Nicosia, Jun 8 (CNA) -- The comings and goings, the public as well as the behind the scenes consultations and machinations of the various players in the most recent UN attempt to settle the question of Cyprus are the theme of a book, entitled ''An International Relations Debacle'', as seen through the eyes of the author, Dr Claire Palley, who has been involved in a series of negotiations over the past few decades. In an interview with CNA, she explains why she felt she had to write this account of what happened and looks ahead to future developments in the continuing effort to find a negotiated settlement in Cyprus. ''The outside world was completely mesmerized by the view put out by the UN about what had happened, the true picture must be given, it must be available to opinion shapers because as long as they believed that the Greek Cypriot side did not want a solution, there would be no impetus for negotiations,'' she said. She said that the process, which had initially begun with a view to reaching a solution, deviated to ''accommodate Turkey and the UN abused the powers given to it'' for suggestions on matters of deep division between the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot positions. Dr Palley calls on her readership to read the book ''with an open mind, knowing that I have sympathies with the Greek Cypriot side.'' ''Take me with a pinch of salt,'' she said in a characteristic manner, when asked if she thought her point of view was convincing. She said she shared the view expressed by Britain's representative for Cyprus, in his book, that unless Turkey gives its seal of approval to a solution, there can be no settlement. ''Turkey has to be brought round to the view that it is to her advantage to settle, noone will use force. The reality is that powers are not going to push Turkey, it will have to decide if it is on its own interests, if it wants to join the EU,'' she said. Responding to questions, she said that at the last phase of the negotiations in Burgenstock, Switzerland, once the UN had realised that President Tassos Papadopoulos was not going to be pushed around, they decided to impose things on the Greek Cypriot side. ''I personally believe that they knew from after the New York meetings they had a pen and could write what they wanted because nobody could stop them,'' Dr Palley said, adding that the UN would continue with this kind of tactics if they were to come back ''because they are so used to doing this, they see this as negotiation in its final stages.'' In New York, she said, in February 2004 when Papadopoulos and the then Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash met with the UN there was ''enormous international pressure with implicit threats to recognise the Turkish Cypriot regime in northern Cyprus.'' This, she pointed out, led to an agreement on tactics and procedures which neither Cypriot side wanted. On what can be done to bring about a solution, she said the two sides have to talk seriously to each other, recalling that ''they have never really talked directly face to face seriously except when (former) President Clerides talked about security.'' She explained that former Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash had actually dictated a proposal, which the Greek Cypriot side accepted. Denktash subsequently withdrew his proposal but the UN had pocketed and used the serious concessions Clerides had already made on the issue of security. Dr Palley is of the opinion that some UN people had great doubts about proceeding with the referendum on the Annan plan, but as she points out others had a job to finish and ''fix it so that Turkey looks Mr Clean.'' She said that there are possibilities for both sides, through serious negotiations, to move nearer and if the two sides talk about common interests they will see there are many things that can be done. ''Turkey has no reason to stop a settlement, she can surrender benefits she has. She has to pay a cost, an internal political cost,'' she added. On lost opportunities and mistakes by the Greek Cypriot sides, Dr Palley said the anti-colonial struggle was wrong, the lack of generosity during negotiations in the late 1960s was also a mistake. She said the next lost opportunity was February 1993 when the impetus was lost.
CNA/MM/GP/2005 ENDS, CYPRUS NEWS AGENCY
An International Relations Debacle: The UN Secretar-General’s Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus 1999-2004. By Claire Palley. Oxford, UK and Portland Oregon, USA. Hart Publishing, 2005. ISBN 1-84113-578-X. 335 pp, illust., hardcover, $45.
Claire Palley’s An International Relation Debacle with its contextual subtitle “The UN Secretary – General’s Missions of Good Offices in Cyprus 1999-2004”, is a book about modern Cypriot political history and the pivotal role of the United Nations in its making, that no student of the Eastern Mediterranean but also of the UN and its “good offices” machinery, can either ignore or dismiss. Its almost four hundreds pages are packed with original materials and documents that are extensively and painstaking footnoted and indexed. Included is also a total of nine appendices running over one hundred pages. One of these, Appendix 6, is a meticulously assembled table comparing the various modifications of the UN Annan Plan for Cyprus that only a legal expert as well an insider with years of continued involvement and archival access could have prepared. Having said this, any objective assessment of the book must factor in not merely the author’s professional background but also her two decades long involvement with Cyprus. Claire Palley is by training a comparative constitutional lawyer, a former UK member of the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minories (1988-1998) and former constitutional consultant to the President of Cyprus (1980-2004). She in fact resigned from her last post for the specific purpose of writing the present book and she so forewarns her readers. She furthermore acknowledges that she is an advocate of a pro-Cypriot perspective. The argument she sets about to substantiate, and does so satisfactorily, is that the Annan Plan in its various incarnations and more particularly in its fifth and final version (Annan V), was a specifically orchestrated attempt to legitimize the fruits of the 1974 Turkish attack on Cyprus that forced one third of the indigenous population to flee their homes and properties, left the third northern part of the country under Turkey’s military occupation and forced the de facto partition of a UN member state. Thus with Turkey’s policies on Cyprus receiving the UN seal of approval through Annan V, Ankara would have been freed of the shackles she created with the 1974 attack, in order to further her more pressing strategic objectives.
In the aftermath of the Turkish invasion the UN Secretary-General was mandated by the Security Council to use the Secretariat’s “good offices” machinery to remedy the situation and to reunify Cyprus, in accordance with the UN Charter and specific resolutions as well as the norms and principles of international law. Instead, charges Palley, beaurocrats in the Secretariat with the more often than not nominal approval of the Secretary-General, abused and corrupted their Security Council mandate -- and attempted , through Annan V, to browbeat one side of the Cyprus dispute --the 80% Greek- Cypriot majority population -- into accepting a plan that decriminalized Turkey’s post-1974 behavior, ensconced the Turkey Army (but also the British military) permanently on the island, legitimized the illegal presence of thousands of Turks that the Ankara government settled on Cyprus in order to alter the demography of the country and obliged those victimized by the 1974 invasion to pay for its costs and damages. Adding insult to injury, the Annan plan would have denied Cypriots recourse to international courts for property claims and other grievances arising out of its implementation. All the while, the Annan - established new state (misnamed “United Cyprus Republic”) would have acquired membership in the European Union and would have continued as an “independent” and “sovereign” member-state of the United Nations.
In the event, when on April 24, 2004, Annan V (with its staggering 10,000 plus pages that took its final form the day before) was placed before the Cypriots for approval it was rejected. According to agreed procedure, Greek and Turkish Cypriots were to cast a “yes” or “no” vote for the plan in simultaneous but separate UN sponsored referenda. Both referenda had to receive separate majorities. Otherwise the Annan Plan, according to its own terms, would have become “null and void”, which is what happened to it on April 24, 2004. The Greek Cypriots rejected the plan by a three - to- one margin (75,8%) while the Turkish Cypriots approved it by a two - to - one margin (65%). The Turkish Cypriot vote, it should be noted, did not genuinely reflect the state of affairs within the community since amongst those voting (according to the UN) were thousands of non-Cypriots Turks, citizens in fact of another country – Turkey. As already noted, successive Ankara governments had implanted these people in Cyprus for patent political purposes.
What comes plainly through in Palley’s learned treatise, even if at times emotionally and sarcastically, is that the actual brokers of the Annan Plan were least concerned about the suffering Cypriots (subjected, in less than two generations, to a colonial war, a civil war, a coup, an invasion and an occupation) and most about serving and balancing the interests of outside powers including, in the case of Secretariat officials, their personal and politically ambitious agendas, that violated their solemn obligations as interventional civil servants.
In its final phase Annan V was in fact driven by two exogenous to Cyprus factors while simultaneously running against a deadline, May 1, 2004. On that day Cyprus, along with nine other candidate countries (having all successfully completed years of arduous neogotiations) was scheduled to become an EU member.
The two exogenous factors were the US war preparations against Iraq and Turkey’s strategic objective of obtaining the unanimous consent of all EU members, (including Cyprus) during the EU summit of December 17 2004, for a specific date to commence negotiations with Brussels for her own accession into the Union. In the Annan plan there was a confluence of these two factors. Washington’s Plan A for attacking Iraq was contingent on Ankara’s active participation. According to this plan US troops were to open of a second front against Baghdad by attacking through Turkey. As for Turkey’s one and only plan for obtaining a date for opening negotiations with Brussels, that was contingent on her accepting UN proposals for Cyprus that Ankara persistently opposed in the past primarily because these plans obligated Turkey to eventually withdraw all her occupations troops (from would be EU member) Cyprus. This was anathema for Turkey’s caudillos who were unwilling to consent to any Cyprus solution that obliged them to withdraw their army from the island. But in turn their intransigent position meant that Turkey’s EU strategy would have gone nowhere.
This state of affairs had to be remedied and remedied it was through Annan V. What eventually happened between the years 2002-2004 that climaxed with the Annan plan fiasco, is a fascinating story of international intrigue, manipulation and deceitful tactics, many of which, but not all, are exhaustively detailed in Palley’s book. Many of them she witnessed firsthand or understood through her active involvement. The role of Annan’s Cyprus Special Adviser Alvaro de Soto (and to considerable extend also that of Britain’s Special Representative to the Cyprus, David Hannay) stands out in this respect. De Soto commanded a large team of experts for his mission that was aided and guided by the US and the UK and, unfortunately as it turned out (and documented in the book pp. 48-55) also surreptiously funded by the US with a single minded objective. This was to first secure Ankara’s consent, at the expense of a balanced plan (that is a prerequisite for a successful negotiation) and then proceed to frogmarch the weaker party into accepting it in order to meet the May 1st deadline. In turn the referenda’s positive outcome would have freed Turkey to address its other pressing domestic and international concerns.
In this respect UN member Cyprus, which placed its faith in the “good offices” of the Secretary-General, confident that the principles of the Charter, relevant to Cyprus Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, jus cogens rules, and other international law restraints and practices, would have ensured a balanced UN Cyprus proposal, found itself not merely shortchanged but also faced with the prospect of being delegitimized as a state. And there is no precedent in the international system of a state that voluntarily self-destructs in order to accommodate the interests of others, even when they purport to speak for the international community.
Claire Palley’s justifiable complaint is that because Cyprus is a very small state partially occupied by a powerful one, that is additionally patronized by even more powerful western powers (the US and the UK), is treated to double standards when it comes to her sovereignty and independence. This, she argues, should not be so and it is incumbent on the UN, its civil servants and primarily the Secretary-General and his staff, not to be blindsided by global power brokers, and accommodate their whims and interests at the expense of fundamental rights and principles that form the backbone of the UN and upon which small and weak state depend for survival.
The record of Annan V shows that Cyprus was in essence treated as a non-sovereign state not merely by Turkey , which was to be expected, but also by the UN Secretariat and its representation in Cyprus. In this sense what Palley chronicles and analyzes with respect to the UN Secretariat and its “good offices” machinery, has implications that extend way beyond a mere case study (Cyprus) and touch upon the very essence and role of the Secretariat, its credibility and, above all, its obligation to uphold Charter principles and to function objectively. The Secretariat can not, as it happened with Cyprus, become an enabler or a marketing instrumentality for interests that seek to turn the Charter on its head in order to implementer their agendas. This is exactly what the UN Secretariat attempted but failed to do with regards to Cyprus, because at the end of the day it run against the majority community that refused to the frogmatched, and declared so loudly and in a democratic way.
Palley’s book is a record of this affair which may in fact represent a trend (a UN culture?) within the UN at a period of time when the office of the Secretariat but also the UN system as a hole is under heavy and justifiable criticism over (abdicating ?) its mandated international role. If this trend continues unabated and is not reversed, the existing restraints and constraints against arbitrariness, illegalities and against the use of force that are embedded in the Charter will gain acceptability, nay even legitimacy. Will states then become better off if self-help prevails in the international system? Those states that may entertain delusions in this respect must be reminded that eventually the bells toll for every one.
Marios L. Evriviades is Assistant Professor of International relations, Panteion University, Athens.
 Turkey’s predicament and the central role of Cyprus in it was articulated best by Assistant Secretary of State for European affairs Elizabeth Jones at the annual Washington American Turkish Association conference of June 6, 2005. Jone’s comments, through made in 2005, were referring and describing US policies during the crucial 2002-2004 period. According to Jone’s, “ Cyprus was a terribly crucial issue for the U.S. The U.S. was of the view that Turkey’s image in the world regarding the Cyprus issue should change. Turkey should be considered as the “good guy” on Cyprus thus changing the existing perceptions in the world. The U.S. recognizes the good job done by Turkey on Cyprus. Because Cyprus, with or without a solution , should not constitute an obstacle to Turkey’s EU accession process. Cyprus should not be an issue regarding Turkey’s EU aspirations”.
Further to the above, another State Department official, Daniel Fried, in the presence also of his colleague Mathew Bryza, briefed an audience of prominent Greek Americans (including journalists) in Washington on June 12, 2003. Inter alia he said the following about US policy that speaks by itself: “When we were trying to persuade Turkey to allow the passage of our troops through its territory into Nothern Iraq, we offered Turkey two incentives, several billion dollars in grants and loans and Cyprus in the form of the Annan Plan”. Cf. also Alex Efthyvoulos, “Contentious Fried statement backing Turkey confirmed,” The Cyprus Weekly, August 5-11, 2005, p.52. Judy Dempsey of the Financial Times (“Europe and America: West’s top guns attempt to clinch Cyprus deal”, February 26, 2003) had this to say on the eve of the Iraq war about the role of the US in tilting the Annan Plan towards Turkey: “Senior members of the Bush administration have suggested an improved deal on the UN package for northern Cyprus in return for Turkey’s co-operation in providing bases and logistics for any US - led war against Iraq.” Finally concerning the wheeling and dealing between Washington and Ankara in preparation for the Iraq war, Timothy Noah writes: “in securing agreement to move US troops through Turkey for an Iraqi invasion, the US government has agreed to pay a bribe of up to $30 billion and has made certain bargains (with Ankara) it isn’t eager to spell out.” (The State, March 3, 2003).
 Cf. the essays in “Where is the international community?” Foreign Policy September / October 2002, pp 28-46.
 Cf. Denis Magalachvili, “Kosovo, a Critique of a Failed Mission“, Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol.16, No.3 (Summer 2005) pp.118-141.